Selection of risk and effort levels among low-stakes players : a case study in online poker by Weiss, Justin
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses Student Research
4-1-2010
Selection of risk and effort levels among low-stakes
players : a case study in online poker
Justin Weiss
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Weiss, Justin, "Selection of risk and effort levels among low-stakes players : a case study in online poker" (2010). Honors Theses. Paper
172.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selection of Risk and Effort Levels Among Low-stakes players:  
A Case Study in Online Poker 
 
 
 
Justin Weiss 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
 Firms pay workers using a variety of different pay structures.  The structure that governs 
executive pay in many instances is a tournament pay structure.  This paper examines the 
applicability of a tournament pay structure to lower wage workers by examining the effort and 
risk responses of players to tournament incentives and the role these responses play in 
determining the tournament’s outcome.  Players from 19 different tournaments are observed on a 
hand by hand basis.  It is found that players adjust effort and risk taking levels but only in 
response to certain incentives.  This study finds evidence that tournaments are a viable pay 
structure for low wage workers under certain conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has led to debate regarding executive compensation.  
Executives are paid based on a tournament pay structure.  The top-level executives get far more 
money than those who work for them.  Although this is a common pay structure for executives, it 
is only one of many possible structures.  Many workers get paid a salary reflective of their 
perceived value to the firm.  Other workers are paid a piece-rate wage equal to the marginal 
revenue product of their labor.  The piece-rate wage is a common form of pay structure for lower 
earning workers, while tournament pay structures are used mostly for higher earning workers. 
This study examines the applicability of a tournament pay structure to lower wage 
workers by examining how low stakes poker players respond to effort and risk taking incentives 
and use effort and risk to affect the tournament outcome.  While tournament pay has been shown 
to increase the productivity of skilled workers, no previous studies have examined the effect of 
similar structures on the behavior of semi-skilled workers.  If lower stakes players are sensitive 
to tournament incentives, an extension of tournament pay structures to semi-skilled workers 
could be an efficient alternative.  To best determine players’ sensitivity to incentives, effort and 
risk taking will be considered as endogenous decisions made by each player in an attempt to 
maximize his net payout. 
  
Literature Review 
 Tournament or contest pay structures arguably provide incentives for workers to increase 
their effort and productivity, consistent with efficiency wage theory.  The study of the 
tournament payment structure reveals that a top-heavy, or accelerated payout structure, leads to 
the efficient resource allocation under many conditions.  For example, tournaments are found to 
 
 
be superior to a piece rate payment structure when it is easier to measure relative output than it is 
the marginal product of labor.  Tournament pay structures lead to increased participant effort by 
incentivizing players to try and earn the disproportionately high payout for first place relative to 
all other ranks.  The impetus for this enhanced effort has been theorized as the incentive effect.  
A second effect, the selection effect asserts that the institutional structure of a tournament as well 
as its payout structure governs who will opt to play and who will select out.  The incentive effect 
motivates individuals who have opted into the tournament to strive hard to earn the 
disproportionately large rewards at the top.  It will be the concern of this paper (Lazear and 
Rosen 1981). 
 Lazear and Rosen (1981) find that under ideal circumstances (homogeneous players, risk-
neutral firms, and purely effort driven production) tournament contests will produce the same 
resource allocations as piece rate pay schemes.  Thus, either has the potential to increase 
efficiency.  However, tournaments are preferable if it is difficult to measure a worker’s absolute 
output but trivial to ordinally measure a worker’s output relative to his peers.  Lazear and Rosen 
find that with risk-averse workers tournaments and piece rate pay schemes lead to different 
resource allocations.  If a worker’s production is uncertain, there is inherent risk in accepting 
compensation based on the marginal product of his labor. Yet, accepting payment based on the 
relative production rank eliminates the danger of systematic randomness.  Telemarketing is an 
example of this given the variable quality of inputs, potential customers’ numbers.  In this 
uncertain production scenario, workers prefer the tournament pay structure because it reduces 
risk.  Alternatively, if productivity is certain, risk-averse workers prefer a wage based on 
marginal revenue product of labor over the less certain tournament payout structure.  In the case 
of workers of heterogeneous abilities, there is no feasible efficient allocation of resources 
 
 
because there exists an inefficient pooling of low and high ability workers (Lazear and Rosen 
1981). 
 Predicated upon these findings, several works have examined the extent of the incentive 
effect of tournaments including Rosen (1986) and Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990).  Rosen 
(1986) finds that elimination tournaments, in which there are sequential rounds of competition 
and the loser is eliminated in each round, necessitate a large grand prize to sustain motivation.  
Effort is costly, and thus players exert the level of effort that maximizes the expected value of 
payoffs net effort costs.  Regardless of risk-neutrality or aversion, homogeneity or heterogeneity, 
and number of rounds, there must be a disproportionately large first prize to sustain effort in later 
rounds.  Rosen demonstrates this is a result of two motivating factors that incentivize a player’s 
effort: the payoff of winning in the given round and the potential payoffs of advancing to the 
next round.  As the tournament progresses, if there is no tournament style first prize, the payoff 
incentive diminishes and effort slackens.   
 Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) use the PGA tour, controlling for the accelerated prize 
structure examined by Rosen, and investigate the incentive effect of larger prize pools.  
Controlling for factors such as course difficulty and weather conditions, they find that for players 
whose membership on the tour is guaranteed, performance improves significantly with the size 
of the prize pool.  More recent study of this prize pool effect reported by Simmons and Frick 
(2007) bring into question the reported magnitude of performance improvement and suggest that 
there is no incentive effect to larger prize pools. 
 The incentive effect research also set the framework for the examination of the role of 
risk in tournaments.  Hvide (2002) tests Rosen’s (1986) theory that when both risk and effort can 
be manipulated by the player, the equilibrium would be one of low effort and high risk.   Hvide 
 
 
(2002) studies why the theorized relative performance evaluation hypothesis is not born out in 
real-world payout structures.  He argues that risk taking will predominate and this can have 
negative consequences to the firm as effort is dropped and variance of production increases.  To 
counter these outcomes, he suggests an alternate pay scheme which sets a reasonable benchmark 
and those that fall closest to it are rewarded in tournament fashion.  Furthermore, Hvide (2002) 
contends that this benchmark explains the discrepancy between the theory that those who excel 
ought to get rewarded the most and the empirical reality that mediocrity is often 
disproportionately rewarded beyond excellence.   
  Grund and Gurtler (2005) examine the effect risk taking has on outcomes in professional 
soccer in Germany.  They find that when risk is taken by a team, the team earns fewer points and 
the variance of points earned is higher.  In the case of soccer, when a team assumes more risk by 
adopting an attacking formation, it loses more frequently than otherwise expected and more total 
goals are scored.   
 Poker is used to test the theoretical and empirical findings of tournament theory.  In order 
to use the game of poker as a basis for empirical analysis, it must be shown to be a game of skill 
and not chance.  Dreef et. al (2003) study the relative skill level in poker and find that a 
simplified form of poker does involve more skill relative to other casino games and enough to be 
considered a game of skill.  Dreef et. al used a simple limit two-player game as opposed to the 
more common many player no limit game.  It is reasonable to extend their findings and suggest 
that due to the greater number of competitors and increased cost of mistakes, many player no 
limit tournaments are likely to contain greater skill than Dreef et. al find in the simplified 
version.   
 
 
 Davidson (2007) examines the decision-making of top professionals in prestigious 
tournaments on the World Poker Tour.  Using World Poker Tour data allows Davidson to see the 
cards each player holds, hole cards.  He finds that despite the aforementioned designation of 
poker as a game of skill, top professionals base their decision making on noise and that Monte 
Carlo simulations outperform professionals in maximizing chip stack.  A distinction is made 
between the static question of maximizing chip stack and the dynamic question of maximizing 
payout.  Davidson finds elite players to be more risk averse than the Monte Carlo simulations 
predict. The observed behavior of elite players may be due to the fact that tournament poker is 
not a game of static optimization but dynamic optimization.  Each player must maintain his stack 
throughout the tournament to avoid elimination.  Davidson concludes that top professionals 
include “noise” in their decision-making process and would likely be better served by using the 
Monte Carlo odds. 
In an attempt to isolate the strategic employment of risk taking, Lee (2004) examines 
high stakes poker tournaments on the World Poker Tour.  He contends that after risk selection, 
effort is a trivial issue.  The amount of risk a player assumes is hypothesized to be impacted by 
the spread between payouts, relative positioning, and stability of relative positioning.  The 
change in chip stack over time is used to proxy risk taking. Lee finds that the predictions of 
tournament theory hold in tournament poker.  If there are large potential monetary gains, i.e. a 
player is close to the player ahead, more risk will be taken.  Similarly, if there are small expected 
losses, i.e. a player is well ahead of the player occupying the rank below, more risk will be 
assumed.   
 The poker literature provides several key insights for this paper.  Poker is a game of skill 
is an assumption of this work.  Were it not, then players could not exert control over their 
 
 
outcome and the theory would disintegrate.  However, luck will still play a large role in 
determining who wins.  Davidson’s findings also suggest that even the best players are not going 
to respond perfectly to incentives due to some degree of risk aversion.  Finally, Lee offers a 
theoretical framework from which to begin.  However, this paper differs in considering both risk 
and effort as simultaneous decisions. 
 
Data: 
 Data was collected from 19 online poker tournaments run on PokerStars.com1
 Each player begins the tournament with $1500 in chips.  These chips may not be 
translated into currency and are collected from players at the end of the tournament in exchange 
for their winnings.  At the beginning of each hand, two players are forced to make opening bets 
before they see their cards, and one player is designated as the dealer.  The dealer does not 
actually deal any cards as this is a computerized process.  The dealer designation is used to 
facilitate the betting process.  These positions rotate in a clockwise manner around the table each 
.  The 
tournament buy-in, amount paid by each player to enter, is $22.  Double up tournaments consist 
of ten players and the tournament begins as soon as ten players register.  The ten entrants play 
until only five players remain.  Each of these five players is then awarded forty dollars.  A 
disadvantage of using this data source is that a player’s hand is not observable and therefore the 
quality of a player’s cards can not be used to control for effort, risk, and winning.  This is the 
first study of its kind to collect data for each hand within a tournament and over multiple 
tournaments.  This provides a much richer data set for estimation.  Additionally, these 
tournaments involve much lower-stakes players than previously studied tournaments in the field.   
                                                          
1 For full definitions of poker terms see Appendix A.  Appendix B provides a screenshot of one hand in the double 
up tournament. 
 
 
hand.  For example, in the first hand the player in position one will be designated the dealer, the 
player to his left will be forced to post a small blind, and the next player to his left will be forced 
to post a big blind.  The small and big blinds are wagers that a player is forced to make before 
the cards are dealt, with the big blind amounting to twice the size of the small blind.  In the 
second hand, the player who posted the small blind becomes the dealer, the player who posted 
the big blind becomes the small blind, and the player to the left of the big blind in the first hand 
posts the big blind.  
 The size of both the small and the big blind change over the course of the tournament in 
order to facilitate the progress of the tournament and shorten its duration.  These changes occur 
at predetermined intervals, every 10 minutes, and according to a specific incremental dollar 
structure.  The blinds and the timing structure are known to all players ex ante.  Additionally, 
after the second increase in blind levels an ante is introduced so that each player is forced to bet 
before their hand is dealt and the blinds are assessed in addition to the antes in the amounts 
indicated2
 Each player’s chip stack, the number of players remaining, the player’s rank, and the chip 
spread between players of adjacent ranks are also observable values.  Whether values for each 
variable are collected at the beginning or end of the hand has an impact on the relevant frame of 
reference for the player.  Each player has a predicted behavior based upon their initial position.  
The impact of those behaviors is measured at the end of each hand.  Variable values are recorded 
at the beginning of each hand and used to construct the rank variable binaries and standardized 
chip counts.  The big blind value is used to standardize chip counts because it serves as a 
minimum betting increment.  In each round of betting a player must bet at least the amount of the 
big blind or not bet at all.  Therefore, as the big blind increases over time, the interpretation of 
. 
                                                          
2 See Appendix C for blind structure details 
 
 
the bet size is biased upward and so too is the change in player’s chip stacks.  For complete 
variable definitions, calculations, and descriptive statistics refer to Table 1. 
(Insert Table 1) 
 In addition to the observed variables mentioned above, an additional collection of 
variables are defined in order to control for different situations a player experiences throughout 
the tournament.  These variables include a set of dummy variables identifying each of the 19 
tournaments, a player identification number which is held constant across all hands, and the 
number of players remaining.  Additional variables are constructed to capture the chip spread 
between adjacent ranks.    
Identifying incentives inherent in the tournament structure are important for predicting 
effort and risk.  The first effort instrument (Leading_Group_Binary) measures whether or not a 
person has enough chips that they are highly likely to finish in the winning cohort.  If a person is 
securely in the money, they have an incentive to solidify their position and assume less risk until 
this position is guaranteed.  The leading group binary equals one when a player is ranked in the 
top three, giving a two rank cushion, and no players outside of the top three have more chips than 
they started the tournament with (implying a non-positive trend in the accumulation of chips).   
In order to meet these conditions a player must break away from the pack. Players who are in a 
break-away group are highly likely to finish in the winning cohort.  Therefore, the returns to 
effort are low for players who have broken away from the pack.   
The clustered chip stack binary variable is designed to account for the impact on effort of 
how closely clustered players are.  If the value of a player’s chip stack is very close to that of 
several of his competitors’, then small gains can result in huge positional changes and the returns 
to effort are high.  The clustered chip stack variable takes a value of one when players a given 
 
 
player is within +/- three bets of three or more competitors.  A player who is three bets behind an 
opponent may make up this difference by winning a pot containing only the blinds, while his 
opponent forfeits the blinds.  This is a trivial difference to overcome.  Under these conditions, 
rank returns to effort are high and a player could place himself in a strong position relative to 
many opponents with moderate gains.   
The big chip stack binary variable captures a player who has a chip stack that is large 
enough to make him a contender.  Such a player has the ability to both bet a hand without getting 
so short on chips that they are forced to commit all their chips to the hand and stave off 
elimination in the short term.  The big chip stack binary variable has a value of one when a given 
player has more than sixteen times the big blind in chips.  (This threshold is selected because 
given the average blinds and the average chip stack, this position is average and in one hand a 
given player can go from average to well above average making the player highly likely to finish 
in the winning cohort.)  In cases where the binary has a value of zero, a player must be careful 
because any hand in which they lose chips will cost them a large percentage of their chip stack 
and make becoming a factor in the tournament a much more difficult task.    
 
Model: 
Theoretical Model: 
Winners in a double up tournament are determined by end of the tournament chip stack, 
with each of the top five players receiving an equal payout.  Thus, players strive to be above the 
threshold which places them in the winning cohort.  As such, the degree to which a player 
enhances their likelihood of winning can be measured absolutely or relatively.  The greater the 
positive change in chip stack a player experiences over a given hand the greater his likelihood of 
 
 
winning because he is gaining a greater share of the fixed amount of chips.  Alternatively, one 
might define the progress towards a winning position by measuring a player’s relative proximity 
to the current threshold number of chips to be among the winning cohort.   
 The likelihood of winning is impacted by chip stack, whether a player is in the blinds, 
effort, and risk taken.  The greater the number of chips a player has at the beginning of a hand, 
the less likely he is to be eliminated during the hand and the more likely he is to finish the hand 
in a strong chip position relative to the threshold.  A player who is forced to post either the small 
or big blind will be less likely to win as they will have chips committed to a hand regardless of 
the strength of their hand.  It is likely for a player in the blinds to be faced with a raise in the first 
round of betting while holding poor cards.  This player will likely fold his hand, and lose the 
chips he is forced to invest.  The effort that a player exerts during a hand is likely to have a 
positive impact on winning.  Effort enhances the player’s ability to perceive more information 
leaked by opponents, or tells, realize which pots are easier to win, and better know the optimal 
sized bet.  The more risk a player takes, the more chips he will either win or lose in a given hand.  
However, since increasing risk is defined with an expected value of 0 it will not have a 
significant impact on a player’s chances of winning3
How much effort to exert is an endogenous decision.  A player may choose to exert more 
or less effort at any juncture based upon how close they are to other players or their relative rank.  
.  Whether the risk is realized as a gain or a 
loss will strongly impact a players likelihood of winning not risk.  Thus, an estimate of the 
impact on winning is: 
 Winning = f{Small_Blind, Big_Blind, Std_CS, Risk, Effort} 
         (-)                (-)        (+)       (?)      (+) 
  
                                                          
3 Davidson (2007) shows that risk can affect winning.  A player who bets everything and loses will necessarily lose, 
but should they win (equal risk) they will not necessarily win.  However, this effect is estimated to be insignificant. 
 
 
Likewise, at any betting juncture a player may choose to minimize risk, folding, or increase risk, 
betting large depending upon how much ground they need to make up and the number of chips 
they have.  Therefore, both risk and effort selection must be modeled as endogenous factors.  
 A player will exert greater effort when either the returns to effort are higher; holding the 
cost effort constant.  The closer a player is to the adjacent higher ranked player in terms of chip 
stack, the greater the potential payout to effort since that player has a greater chance of 
improving their relative rank and strengthening their relative positioning.  The returns to effort 
are also larger when gaining a rank changes the position of a player in comparison to the winning 
cohort.  For example, one would expect effort to be greater for players of ranks four, five, and six 
as they try to break into or stay in the winning cohort.   
In addition to the relative rank of a player, effort is also influenced by the absolute 
position as measured by chip stack.  There is a diminishing marginal utility to earning chips.  A 
player needs his first few chips to remain alive in the tournament.  Additional chips then add to 
the size of his stack with large percentage changes in the size of his stack due to the first few 
chips and smaller percentage changes as he accumulates more and more chips.  Therefore, the 
returns to effort will decrease with size of a player’s chip stack.  A player who holds a large chip 
stack relative to the winning threshold is in a strong position and will need to exert less effort to 
remain in the winning cohort.  Thus, a player in the leading group will exert less effort.  
Conversely, a player whose chip stack is very close in size to multiple players will be able to 
greatly improve his relative rank with small increases in his chip stack.  Therefore, if a player’s 
chip stack is very near that of a cluster of players, he will exert more effort.  As time progresses 
the blinds increase, fewer bets are available to the table (as total chips are fixed), larger bets 
 
 
occur and thus a player’s tournament life is more precarious.  Additionally, surviving later hands 
in a tournament increases the probability of receiving a payout.  Thus, effort may be modeled: 
 Effort = f{Time, Rank, Leading_Group, Clustered_CS, Big_CS, Std_CS, Std_Spd,  
         (+)     (?)             (-)    (+)           (-)           (-)           (-) 
     Play_Rem} 
            (-)    
 
As is characteristic of risk/reward tradeoffs, the more risk a player assumes, the greater 
the variance of the player’s outcomes.  It is important to distinguish between the baseline level of 
risk inherent in the tournament and the marginal risk assumed by players.  For simplicity, risk 
refers to the marginal risk assumed by players beyond the risk inherent in the tournament.  
Examples of marginal risk taking include bluffing and calling bets while holding weak hands.  
 Risk taking will decrease when either the returns to risk are lower or the costs of risk are 
higher.  A player who is several ranks behind the winning cohort will be unlikely to finish in the 
winning cohort without assuming marginal risk.  Therefore, for players of lower ranks, the 
returns to risk are high.  The further a player is behind the player of adjacently lower rank, the 
more risk he will need to take to have a chance to catch up.  A player forced to post either blind 
will have higher risk because of not only the forced bet, but because the bet changes the relative 
price of playing.  Players will want to assume more risk as they exert more effort.  Effort 
increases a player’s chances of winning or knowing when he is beat.  Therefore, a player will 
want to increase the variance of his outcomes knowing he will be more likely to win the hand, or 
know when to fold and minimize losses.   
The level of risk taking will also respond to changes in the cost of risk.  If in the first 
round of betting a player raises the bet to twice the size of the big blind, the player in the big 
blind must only commit half as many chips as others, and the small blind only 75% as many.  
 
 
Therefore, a player does not need as strong of cards to justify playing out of the blinds because it 
is relatively cheaper to play while the potential returns are just as large.  As blinds increase, 
given the fixed nature of total chips in the tournament, the number of bets available declines.  
This causes eliminations to occur more rapidly and shrinks the time until the winning cohort is 
named.  The consequences of losing a great number of chips in the latter stages of the 
tournament will likely be severe.  Therefore, risk is expected to decrease with the number of 
hands played; all else equal.  As players are eliminated, one’s chances of finishing in the winning 
cohort increase.  Risk is more costly given a greater chance of winning.  A big win still increases 
one’s probability of winning but a big loss severely reduces ones probability of finishing in the 
winning cohort.  A player who has barely more chips than the adjacent lower ranked player faces 
a high cost of risk.  If he is to lose chips he will fall in rank whereas, all else equal, he is less 
likely to move up a rank with similar gains.  Thus risk levels are expected to be lower when the 
(-) Spread is small.  As the (+) Spread increases, the returns to risk are higher, as a player will 
need to assume risk to catch the adjacently higher ranked player.   
The level of risk taken also depends upon the risk tolerance of individual players in a 
given tournament.  Therefore, the player must be controlled for in evaluating risk selection.  
Each tournament consists of a different group of players with only eight players appearing in 
more than one tournament.  Therefore, the player binary will be used to control for fixed effects 
within each tournament.  Thus, risk may be modeled: 
 Risk = f{Rank, Std_CS, Std_Spd, Small_Blind, Big_Blind, Tourn, Player, Hand,  
       (+)        (-)         (+)              (+)                (+)           (?)        (?)       (-) 
   BB_Level, Play_Rem, Effort} 
           (-)    (-)           (+) 
 
  
 
 
 Empirical Model: 
 A player bases how much risk to take in part upon the endogenous selection of risk as 
previously discussed.  The likelihood of winning is endogenously affected by both risk and 
effort.  Therefore, in order to estimate effort, risk, and winning, a three-stage least squares model 
is needed.  The leading group binary, the clustered chip stack binary, and the big chip stack 
binary instrument for effort.  These variables capture specific incentive structures present for a 
given player in a given hand.  The big blind level variables, number of hands played, and player 
serve as instruments for risk.  These variables describe risk incentives in any given hand. 
 
Results: 
Winning: 
 The White corrected results for the winning regression are presented in Table 2.  The 
results are consistent with expectations.  Whether or not a player is forced to post a blind has no 
significant impact on a player’s chances of winning.  The number of bets a player has in his chip 
stack significantly and positively impacts his ability to win.  Players who try harder place 
themselves in a better position relative to the winning cohort than players who exert less effort.  
The results also indicate that the more risk a player assumes, the better position he places himself 
in relative to the winning cohort.  Davidson (2007) found that top professionals were risk averse 
in tournaments and did not maximize the expected size of their chip stack.  They left expected 
value on the table4
                                                          
4 This clearly holds in the case of static maximization.  However, as Davidson notes, tournaments are a dynamic 
game and it is unclear if this conservative play relative to static maximization is an optimal strategy in the dynamic 
case.  By extension, the same caveat will apply in the low stakes game. 
.  If this result extends to lower stakes players, then it stands to reason that 
players who assume more risk than their more conservative opponents are able to pick up the 
expected value left on the table by their opponents.  If players gain extra expected value for 
 
 
taking more risk, then risk will significantly increase one’s chances of winning.  Consistent with 
theory, the size of a player’s chip stack, the effort exerted, and risk taken were found to be the 
most significant predictors of winning. 
 
(Insert Table 2) 
Effort: 
 The robust results for the effort regression are presented in Table 3.  The results are 
generally consistent with expectations, with a few exceptions.  Players who hold the top position 
in the rankings exert significantly less effort as may be expected given the lower marginal gains 
to effort.  Players with larger chip stacks also exhibit less effort.  This is consistent with 
expectations as there is a diminishing marginal utility to chips.  At the margin it is less critical 
for a player who has more chips to gain chips than a player who has fewer chips and is thus in 
greater danger of being eliminated and not making the winning cohort.    Similarly, players who 
are in a leading group that has broken away from the pack exert significantly less effort than 
those who are not in so comfortable of a position.  This is consistent with the expectation as the 
returns to effort for those who are highly likely to win are small relative to other players’ returns.  
Players with values of their chip stacks very close to many of their competitors’ try significantly 
harder than other players as predicted given the increasing rank returns to effort for players with 
clustered chip stacks.  Results also indicate that the further a player is behind the player ranked 
immediately ahead, the significantly less effort they will exert.  This is consistent with 
expectations as the rank returns to effort are larger when a player is very close to surpassing the 
player ranked adjacently ahead of him.  However, unexpectedly, the further ahead the player is, 
 
 
the significantly harder he tries.  This is inconsistent with the idea that the rank returns to effort 
are lower as a player gets further and further ahead of the player ranked adjacently below him. 
 Additionally, results indicate that the longer a tournament lasts and the more players that 
are eliminated, the significantly less effort a player will exhibit, contrary to expectations.  The 
returns to effort are higher as the time the winning cohort is formed draws nearer.  However, the 
longer a tournament goes, the more fatigue becomes a factor.  With sixteen of nineteen 
tournaments lasting longer than forty minutes, players may fatigue, significantly reducing the 
level of effort exerted with time.  Furthermore, as players are eliminated, one’s probability of 
winning increases.  Thus the potential lower returns to effort may explain the significant 
decrease in effort with the number of players remaining.  
  
(Insert Table 3) 
 
Risk:   
 Table 4 presents the White corrected results for risk.  In order to fully capture the impact 
of tournament progress on risk taking a dummy variable for each hand is included.  The results 
show that risk decreases significantly over hands with a large drop in risk taking after hand 12, 
and a small but significant decrease over the life of the tournament thereafter.  More than 80% of 
the hand binaries are significant at the 5% level.  This is consistent with expectations as the 
longer a tournament goes the fewer the total bets remaining in the tournament, and the faster 
eliminations will occur.  Therefore, the cost of risk is higher the longer the tournament goes.  A 
player with more chips will assume significantly less risk as expected because there are lower 
returns to risk as a player’s chip stack increases.  The returns to chips are lower as chip stack 
 
 
increases because at the margin it is less vital for a player with more chips to gain chips than a 
player with fewer chips because the player with fewer chips is closer to elimination and in a 
relatively weaker position relative to the winning cohort. 
 As expected, a player will take significantly more risk the greater the cushion a player has 
on the adjacently ranked trailing player (negative spread) or the greater gap a player faces 
between himself and the adjacent higher ranked player (positive spread).   As a player falls 
further and further behind the adjacently better ranked player, he must assume more risk in order 
to catch up.  Similarly, the further and further ahead a player gets from the adjacently worse 
ranked player, the lower the rank cost of risk as the less likely he is to be caught by the trailing 
player.  Players in the role of the small and big blind take significantly more risk than other 
players.  A player who assumes the role of the small blind or the big blind is forced to commit 
some chips to pot, and the thus the relative price of calling a bet in the first round of betting is 
lower to them than to any other player in the tournament.  As a result, one would expect them to 
take on significantly more risk.  The degree to which players take on risk should decrease as the 
number of players remaining in the tournament decreases, because the cost of risk is greater 
given the increased likelihood of winning when there are fewer players remaining.  Results 
indicate a significant decrease in the level of risk as players are eliminated.  Consistent with 
theory, the most significant explanatory variables in the risk model were the spread variables, the 
amount of time elapsed, and the number of players remaining. 
 Results indicate that effort also impacts risk taking.  Rosen (1986) and others theorize 
that risk is substituted for effort.  Therefore, effort should have a negative relationship with risk.  
However, results indicate that increases in effort lead to significant increases in risk taking.  One 
plausible explanation for this result is that low stakes poker players’ motivations may differ from 
 
 
those of executives on which previous studies based their analysis.  Additionally, players may 
identify that they are increasing their effort and therefore also try and significantly increase the 
variance of their outcomes because they expect a more favorable outcome.   
 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
Caveats: 
 Caution must be taken in drawing generalized conclusions from this study of double up 
tournaments.  The models explain only a portion of winning as well as effort and risk selection.  
While skill plays a significant role in determining the outcome, luck is also a significant 
component as found by Dreef et al (2003).  Therefore, prediction of winning, no matter how 
measured, will be of limited power.  This level of randomness imposes a ceiling on the degree of 
variation that can be explained by the model.  The R squared for effort (.0164), risk (.1005), and 
winning (.0252) indicates that the full effect has either not been captured or not been explained.  
This could be due to measurement error with regard to the dependent variables or due to an 
incomplete theoretical framework.   
The results presented rely on accurate measurements of effort and risk.  Effort is proxied 
by a comparison of the outcome of a hand versus an average of the player’s hand outcomes.   
Players with an early negative rolling average, potentially just from being in a blind early in the 
tournament, will have much higher measured effort all else equal.  The converse also holds.  
Hole cards dealt and community cards dealt are also random components that will influence 
effort measurement.  These chance occurrences will affect measured effort without 
 
 
corresponding effects on actual effort.  Measurement error is also indicated in effort by the 
results: as time elapsed had a more significant effect on effort than any other variable.  
The same logic applies to the measurement of risk.  Risk is measured as the absolute 
standardized change in chip stack of a player in a given hand.  However, a player who is dealt 
few decent cards will generally show less “risk” than a player with average cards who will 
exhibit less risk, as measured, than a player with great cards.  Furthermore, the way effort and 
risk are proxied leads to a correlation between them.  This is a possible explanation for the 
positive relationship between risk and effort found in the prediction of risk taking. 
 
Conclusions: 
  This study sheds light on the degree to which risk and effort influence winning amongst 
low stakes players operating under a tournament pay scheme.  The study applied the theory of 
tournament pay, to the selection of risk and effort by low stakes players in double up 
tournaments in order to explain winning.  Results are generally as expected.  Effort was 
demonstrated to have a significant and positive impact on winning.  Effort was demonstrated to 
be positively correlated with risk taking in a departure from theory in the field (Rosen 1986).  
This result is mitigated by this study’s inability to explain effort.  Risk taking was found to be 
negatively impacted by proximity to adjacently ranked players and decreased as the number of 
players remaining in the tournament decreased and as a player’s chip stack increased.   
 These results suggest that risk is not a substitute for effort as predicted by Rosen (1986).  
In this vane, tournaments do appear to be a viable alternate to piece rate wages for low stakes 
workers when faced with otherwise similar conditions as high stakes workers.  This conclusion 
 
 
must be qualified by the potential measurement error in proxying for both risk and effort, and the 
degree to which the determinants of winning were unidentified.   
 A natural extension of this work would be an examination of different types of low stakes 
tournaments to determine if the effects found in this study extend beyond this tournament 
structure.  Future studies that obtain hole card information would be better able to proxy for both 
effort and risk.  Additionally, obtaining data for each round of betting rather than each hand 
would allow for better estimation of risk and effort.  A player is able to reselect effort and risk at 
each betting juncture within each given hand.  The combination of observable hole cards and 
intermediate betting rounds would allow for better proxying and prediction of risk and effort.    
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Table 1: 
Variable Name Definition Calculation Min Max Mean Time 
Collected 
Player A number assigned to each player depending 
upon their location at the table.  Player 1 is at 1 
o’clock on the table and players are numbered 
clockwise through 9. 
Observed 
Value 
1 10 5.40 Beginning 
of hand 
Tournament A number assigned to each individual 
tournament starting with the first observed and 
going to the last observed (Tournament 18) 
Observed 
Value 
1 19 9.81 Beginning 
of hand 
Chip Stack (CS) The number of “chips” that a player has.  Chips 
are given in dollar amounts and a player may 
only bet the chips he has.  $1 in chips does not 
equal $1USD.  There is no conversion rate as 
no conversions are allowed. The data is 
collected at the end of each hand. 
Observed 
Value 
0 15000 1848.8 Beginning 
of hand 
Big Blind Level The big blind is a forced bet made by 1 player 
each hand before cards are dealt. The big blind 
rotates clockwise around the table.  It increases 
at 10 minute intervals.   
Observed 
Value 
20 300 94.78 Beginning 
of hand 
Small Blind 
Level 
Exactly half of the size of the big blind.  
Structurally the same as the big blind.  Made by 
the player on the right of the big blind. 
Observed 
Value 
10 150 47.39 Beginning 
of hand 
Big Blind A binary variable with value 1 when a given 
player is forced to post the big blind in a given 
hand 
IF(Big 
Blind)=1 
0 1 .123 Beginning 
of hand 
Small Blind A binary variable with value 1 when a given 
player is forced to post the small blind in a 
given hand.  
IF(Small 
Blind)=1 
0 1 .123 Beginning 
of hand 
Standardization 
Factor (SF) 
The size of the big blind.  If the big blind is 30, 
then the standardization factor is 30.  It is a unit 
free measure 
=Big Blind 20 300 94.78 Beginning 
of hand 
Time Elapsed The amount of time elapsed from the beginning 
of the first hand until the beginning of the 
current hand.  This will not be included as it is 
perfectly multicolinear given the big blind. 
IF (big blind = 
20) = 0 
IF (big blind = 
30) = 10 
IF (big blind = 
50) =20… 
0 70 25.71 Beginning 
of hand 
Players 
Remaining 
The number of players who have not been 
eliminated from the tournament at the 
beginning of a given hand 
Observed 
Value 
6 10 8.36 Beginning 
of hand 
Rank_1 A binary variable that equals one if the player 
has the most chips at the end of a given hand.   
IF(Rank=1) =1 
If not = 0 
0 1 .12 Beginning 
of hand 
Rank An ordinal variable that reflects the relative 
positioning of a player.  If a player has the most 
chips of any player, rank =1, if the second 
most, rank =2.  This continues through rank 9.  
There are no ties in rank, if two players have 
the same number of chips, the one with the 
lowest (best) rank entering the hand will get the 
lower (better) rank.  Once a player has folded 
out they are assigned the rank that they finish 
the hand in.  If two or more players bust, they 
are ranked based upon the number of chips they 
had entering the hand as per tournament rules. 
Observed 
Value 
1 10 4.68 Beginning 
of hand 
 
 
(+) Spread The number of chips a player would need to 
gain to have the same number of chips as the 
player ranked immediately ahead.  A player 
ranked number 1 has a (+) spread of 0. 
|rank(i+1)’s 
CS – rank(i)’s 
CS| 
0 8875 340.58 Beginning 
of hand 
Standardized (+) 
Spread 
The (+) spread divided by the standardization 
factor. 
[(+) Spread] / 
SF 
0 108.75 4.52 Beginning 
of hand 
(-) Spread The number of chips a player would have to 
lose to have the same number of chips as the 
player one rank behind.  The 9th ranked player 
is assigned a (-) Spread equal to 0. 
rank(i)’s CS – 
rank(i+1)’s CS  
0 8875 426.71 Beginning 
of hand 
Standardized (-) 
Spread 
The (-) Spread divided by the standardization 
factor. 
[(-) Spread] / 
SF 
0 108.75 5.74 Beginning 
of hand 
Leading Group A binary variable that equals one when a player 
is ranked in the top three and there are three or 
fewer players with more than 1500 chips. 
IF(Rank<=3) 
and IF(…) = 1 
0 1 0.22 Beginning 
of hand 
Clustered Chip 
Stack 
A binary variable that equals one when a player 
is within +/- 3 big blinds worth of chips of at 
least three other players.  
1 IF: 
Count(CSi-
CSj<=3SF)>=3 
0 1 0.36 Beginning 
of hand 
Big Chip Stack A binary variable that equals one when a player 
has greater than 15 bets remaining 
IF(St.CS>15) 
= 1 
If not = 0 
0 1 0.67 Beginning 
of hand 
Standardized 
Chip Stack 
The chip stack divided by the size of the big 
blind.  The standardization is done at the end of 
the hand with the big blind that was played in 
the hand. 
CS / SF 0.43 189.75 34.41 Beginning 
of hand 
Change in Chip 
Stack 
The difference between a player’s chip stack in 
one hand from the hand before.  This is also 
measured at the end of the hand. 
CSn+1 – CSn -4040 4200 0.00 End of 
hand 
Standardized 
Change in Chip 
Stack 
The difference between a player’s chip stack in 
one hand from the hand before divided by the 
standardization factor 
(CSn+1 – CSn) / 
SF 
-75 104 0.00 End of 
hand 
Absolute Change The absolute value of the change in a player’s 
chip stack from hand n to hand n+1  
|CSn+1 – CSn| 0 4200 91.22 End of 
hand 
Standardized 
Absolute Change 
(Risk) 
The absolute value of the change in a player’s 
chip stack from hand n to hand n+1 divided by 
the standardization factor to get the absolute 
value of the change in bets from one hand to 
the next. 
Absolute 
Change / SF 
0 104 1.25 End of 
hand 
Chips to 
Threshold 
(Winning) 
The difference between a given player’s chip 
stack and the chip stack of the 5th ranked 
player.  The number of chips a player is away 
from joining the winning cohort. 
CSi-CS5 
CS5=5th ranked 
player’s CS 
-1795 8830 364.57 End of 
hand 
Hand The number of hands that have been dealt in the 
given tournament including the current hand 
Observable 1 106 33.93 Beginning 
of hand 
%Change in 
Chip Stack 
The percentage change in the chips a given 
player has from the beginning of the hand to the 
end of the hand. 
(CSk+1 – CSk) / 
(CSk) 
-1 3.14 0.01 End of 
hand 
Effort The difference between the percent change in 
chips a player experiences in a given hand and 
the average percent change in chips that they 
have had up to that point. 
(%CHG_CS) – 
(AVG%_Chg_
CS) 
-1.04 3.11 -0.01 End of 
hand 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coefficients 
Intercept 151.2412*** 
 (9.69) 
 
 
Small_Blind 50.6096 
 (1.56) 
0.0161 
 
Big_Blind 47.2649 
 (1.44) 
0.0150 
 
Std_CS 5.3852*** 
(15.73) 
0.1416*** 
Risk 12.2197*** 
 (3.57) 
0.0496*** 
 
Effort 187.9870*** 
(2.88) 
0.0302*** 
R Squared .0252  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates with robust t-values below in parentheses.  All results are two tail test results.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coefficients 
Intercept 0.1112*** 
 (3.62) 
 
 
Time -0.0018*** 
 (-3.50) 
-0.1761*** 
 
Rank_1 -0.0259* 
 (-1.68) 
-0.0456* 
 
Rank_2 -0.0018 
 (-0.10) 
-.0032 
 
Rank_3 -0.0178 
 (-1.09) 
-0.0312 
 
Rank_4 -0.0224 
(-1.38) 
-0.394 
Rank_5 -0.0224 
 (-1.34) 
-0.394 
 
Rank_6 -0.0260 
 (-1.48) 
-0.0457 
 
Rank_7 -0.0264 
 (-1.47) 
-0.0425 
 
Rank_8 -0.0059 
 (-0.31) 
-0.0086 
 
Rank_9 -0.0207 
 (-0.99) 
-0.0245 
 
Leading Group -0.0126* 
 (-1.70) 
-0.0278* 
 
Clustered CS 0.0113** 
 (2.27) 
0.0290** 
 
Big CS -0.0047 
 (-0.67) 
-0.0117 
 
Std CS -0.0015*** 
 (-5.67) 
-.2117*** 
 
Std Spd Pos -0.0010*** 
 (-2.85) 
-0.0507*** 
 
Std Spd Neg 0.0013*** 
 (4.46) 
0.0711*** 
 
Play_Rem_9 -0.0096* 
 (-1.91) 
-0.0213* 
 
Play_Rem_8 -0.0100* 
 (-1.76) 
-0.0226* 
 
Play_Rem_7 -0.0007 
 (-0.07) 
-0.0013 
 
Play_Rem_6 0.0121 
 (1.12) 
0.0222 
 
R Squared .0164  
This table presents coefficient estimates with robust t-values below in parentheses.  All results are two tail test results.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4: 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coefficients 
Intercept 5.1871*** 
 (4.01) 
 
 
Time -0.0425 
 (-0.78) 
-0.1666 
 
BBLevel 0.0102 
(0.96) 
.15822 
Std CS -0.0303** 
 (-2.02) 
-0.179** 
 
Std Spd Pos 0.0832*** 
 (5.02) 
0.1692*** 
 
Std Spd Neg 0.1098*** 
 (4.30) 
0.2492*** 
 
Small Blind 0.7050*** 
 (6.01) 
0.0507*** 
 
Big Blind 1.2749*** 
 (10.47) 
0.0917*** 
 
Play_Rem_9 -1.1624*** 
 (-3.75) 
-0.1059*** 
 
Play_Rem_8 -1.7124*** 
 (-4.86) 
-0.1585*** 
 
Play_Rem_7 -2.1870*** 
 (-5.35) 
-0.1646*** 
 
Play_Rem_6 -2.4216*** 
 (-5.55) 
-0.1810*** 
 
Effort 2.1090*** 
 (2.80) 
0.0865*** 
 
R Squared .1005  
This table presents coefficient estimates with robust t-values below in parentheses.  All results are two tail test results.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
Hand, player, tournament, and rank binaries were also included as controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: 
Term Definition 
Big 
Blind 
The big blind is a forced bet made by 1 player each hand before cards are dealt. The big blind 
rotates clockwise around the table.  It increases at regular intervals (often 10 minutes).   
Buy-in The amount of money a player must pay to enter into a tournament.  It includes money that 
will go into the prize pool and an entrance fee taken by the casino/site. 
Chip 
Stack 
The total number of chips that a given player holds.  Every player has a starting chip stack of 
1500. 
Chips The unit of account in a poker tournament.  A player is issued chips in exchange for his buy-in 
into the tournament.  At tournaments there is no exchange rate to translate chips into dollars.  
When a player has no chips remaining he is eliminated.  Chips are recollected from winners at 
the end of the tournament in exchange for their payout. 
Dealer A designation given to one player in each hand.  This player bets last in each round of betting 
after the first round.  The player designated the dealer does not actually deal the cards as this 
is conducted automatically.  A player is only the dealer for one hand before the designation 
rotates to the player to his left. 
Hole 
Cards 
Every player is dealt two cards face down at the beginning of every hand.  These two cards are 
referred to as the player’s hole cards. 
Pot The sum of the chips that have been bet by all players in a given hand. 
Small 
Blind 
Exactly half of the size of the big blind.  Structurally the same as the big blind.  Made by the 
player on the right of the big blind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C: 
Duration Small Blind Amount Big Blind Amount 
0-10 10 20 
10-20 15 30 
20-30 25 50 
30-40 50 100 
40-50 75 150 
50-60 100 200 
60-70 125 250 
70-80 150 300 
 
No tournament lasted longer than 80 minutes. 
 
